VOLUME 88, ISSUE 2  |  December 2009

 

Articles

Prof. Daniel A. Crane

88 Texas L. Rev. 253 (2009)

"Intellectual property" is increasingly becoming a misnomer, since incentives to create are today often granted in the form of liability rights rather than a property-type right to exclude. In this Article, Professor Crane revisits the assumptions implicit in the term "intellectual property," finding that the debate over whether liability or property rules provide better incentives focuses too narrowly on the pros and cons of the right to exclude.


Prof. Laurent Sacharoff

88 Texas L. Rev. 301 (2009)

The Constitution provides former Presidents with no powers or role, and yet numerous former presidents have asserted executive privilege in order to withhold information from Congress, historians, and the public. In this Article, Professor Sacharoff argues that former presidents should not retain any power to assert executive privilege.


 

Book Reviews

Prof. Paul Finkelman

88 Texas L. Rev. 353 (2009)

Professor Finkelman reviews two books on constitutional and Supreme Court history: The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789–2008 and The Supreme Court: An Essential History.


 

Notes

Rex A. Mann

88 Texas L. Rev. 391 (2009)

In this Note, Mann discusses the problems with the current management of the High Plains Aquifer—the largest mainland aquifer in the United States.


Travis R. Wimberly

88 Texas L. Rev. 415 (2009)

In this Note, Wimberly addresses one of the areas where trademark protections break down--the problem of "holdover licensees," when an entity formerly licensed to use a mark continues to do so after the license has expired or terminated.


An Online Companion to Texas Law Review
 
Sarah E. Agudo

Wed, 2009-10-14

In this piece, Sarah Agudo responds to Professor Wildenthal's criticism of a prior Texas Law Review article authored by her and Professor Steven G. Calabresi discussing, among more than 100 other individual rights, grand jury rights.  Agudo responds to several of Professor Wildenthal's critiques of her methodology, while noting that some of his suggestions provide useful areas in which to expand the research on the state constitutional history of grand juries in future publications.

Guha Krishnamurthi, Jon Reidy, Michael J. Stephan, and Shane Pennington

Tue, 2009-10-13

In this Response Note to Jeremy Waldron's The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, the Authors defend judicial majoritarianism, which is the use of majority decisionmaking among judicial officers who possess the power of judicial review. In defending judicial majoritrianism, the Authors contend that Professor Waldron's arguments against majoritarian decisionmaking merely reassert traditional arguments against judicial review rather than adding any new ideas to the debate.

Prof. Mae C. Quinn

Tue, 2009-10-13

In this response piece, Professor Mae C. Quinn examines Brian Tamanaha's efforts to recast the "who" and "what" of the Legal Realism movement in his recent article.  Professor Quinn applauds Professor Tamanaha's attempt to rescue from obscurity some of Legal Realism's forgotten pioneers.  But as Professor Tamanaha, like others examining the Realist movement, neglected to discuss the contribution of women to the movement, Professor Quinn seeks to recover this history.  Specifically, she examines the story of Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross, whose legal career embodied the tenants of Realism that Professor Tamanaha acknowledged as most significant.

Joshua A. Douglas

Sun, 2009-10-11

In this Essay, Douglas tells us that "[t]he most surprising action from the Supreme Court’s latest term may be what it did not do:  strike down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act . . . as unconstitutional." Douglas explores the Court's recent decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), in which the Justices managed to avoid invalidating Congress's reauthorization of the "preclearance" provision of the Voting Rights Act (which requires preapproval for changes to voting procedures in covered jurisdictions). This Essay explores the reasons behind the Court's 8–1 opinion, which resolved the issue on narrow statutory grounds, and what the comments in dicta by various Justices may mean for future election law cases.