William Shieber

87 Texas L. Rev. See Also 37

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In this comment, William Shieber argues that Professor Crane’s analysis is fundamentally flawed for two reasons.  First, Shieber suggests that Crane’s measure of how to judge political interest—considering references to antitrust issues in presidential candidate speeches, and considering the absence of direct Presidential involvement in filing antitrust suits—is wanting.  Second, Shieber considers the fact that both the Federal Trade Commission and the DOJ, the agencies responsible for antitrust enforcement, are overseen by political appointees.  From this, Shieber argues that one cannot remove the values of these appointees from the regulatory process, which necessarily means that the ultimate decisions made by these agencies have a substantial political component.  For these reasons, Shieber disagrees with Crane’s conclusion that U.S. antitrust enforcement has declined in political salience.