Give ‘Em Enough Rope: Optimal Design of Executive Pay and Rent Extraction

Simone M. Sepe

89 Texas L. Rev. See Also 143

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Due to recent debates concerning executive compensation, incentive structures are increasingly scrutinized.  Professor Sepe reponds to Professor Fried’s argument by (i) challenging the notion that efficiency necessarily results from preventing managers from capturing extra returns, as managers may use these returns effectively, and (ii) arguing that the social costs of overpriced equity offerings are unclear.  Indeed, Sepe concludes that payment of extra returns to managers may be “necessary to preserve incentives not to waste corporate assets.”

The Continuing Relevance of the Establishment Clause: A Reply to Professor Richard C. Schragger

Caroline Mala Corbin

89 Texas L. Rev. See Also 125

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Professor Richard C. Schragger has identified current underenforcement of the Establishment Clause.  However, he may not have identified the right reasons for this underenforcement, Professor Corbin argues.  Rather, state actions with persuasive secular justifications may not implicate the Establishment Clause to the extent that Professor Schragger believes.  Moreover, apparently problematic statements of government officials may be protected as private speech.  Finally, fear of backlash against minorities may animate underenforcement.

Furthermore, Professor Corbin is unconvinced that decentralization is the answer given the benefits of disestablishment, costs of abandoning disestablishment norms, Professor Schragger’s privileging of conflict avoidance over other Establishment Clause norms, and the potential for backlash against religious minorities.

Professor Corbin argues that these observations may lead to different conclusions than those of Professor Schragger.

The Law Professor as Counterterrorist Tactician

Lawrence Rosenthal

89 Texas L. Rev. See Also 113

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Scholars have long sought to identify an optimal counterterrorist strategy, particularly in light of the September 11 attacks.  Professor Rosenthal responds to Professor Huq’s critique of the use of religious speech and statements of belief for counterterrorist purposes.  In doing so, Rosenthal argues that such statements may offer appropriate and reliable evidence of motive and intent, as in the case of Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, in investigations and prosecutions of terrorists.

Rosenthal identifies the costs associated with forgoing such an investigation of religious speech, and Professor Huq’s argument is not to the contrary.  Rosenthal argues that investigators and prosecutors must be able to rely on these statements just as they are used to initiate an investigation, and the costs of forgoing this reliance could be catastrophic.  Indeed, Huq’s proposal to identify insular groups may require reliance on statements of belief given the lack of information available otherwise.

Rosenthal concludes that the lack of implementation of Professor Huq’s proposals by accountable policy makers may suggest their limited value.