Michael Stokes Paulsen
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 56
In this Comment to Professor Shapiro’s Article, Professor Paulsen—a known skeptic of constitutional stare decisis—colorfully analyzes how different approaches to precedent affect strategic coalition building on a multimember Court. Under this new tactical theory, Professor Paulsen speculates how his views on constitutional precedent might affect his relative power as a fellow member of Justice Shapiro’s Court.
Robert S. Bickerstaff
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 38
Professor Robert S. Bickerstaff offers a response to Professor Kousser’s article that includes both a contrary analysis of Supreme Court decisions regarding Section 5 and also a detailed discussion of the precise effects of Section 5 on minority representation by elected officials. Professor Bickerstaff offers insights based on his thirty-two years of experience representing jurisdictions covered by the election-change review process of Section 5. Although much has been accomplished, real-world application of Section 5, particularly against the backdrop of partisan politics, has presented new challenges for achieving the goal of meaningful minority participation.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 22
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in the District of Columbia gun-ban case promises to make this Term “The Year of the Gun.” Though the Court will review many other important cases, the Heller case presents a unique constellation of characteristics: It involves the scope of a right that many Americans regard as highly important, but that has not been significantly addressed by the Supreme Court before, and it does so in an unusually open national election year, with no incumbent or obvious successor running for president.
Though the Court did address Second Amendment issues somewhat in the 1939 case of United States v. Miller, the treatment was limited, and uninformed by opposing counsel because only the federal government was represented. The Court’s decision in Heller will thus give the Justices a chance to address—or to duck—a number of important Second Amendment issues and may also pose potential difficulties for the Court’s existing jurisprudence of unenumerated rights, in a setting in which the political ramifications are likely to be obvious and immediate.
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 26
In response to Professor Littwin’s Article, Ronald Mann compliments the article’s focus on the consumers of credit cards, rather than the lenders. Mann cites two important contributions from the article. The first is the surprising importance of credit cards in maintaining social status in the milieu that Littwin studies. The second contribution is crystallizing the need for credit-card products that offer real precommitment.
Mann also praises her research on the use of credit cards at the family level, as opposed to the national or company level. Finally, Mann defends Littwin’s decision to focus on a particular demographic group because the differentiation of credit-card products means that choices available to low-income consumers will be very different from middle- and upper-income consumers. But Mann wants to broaden the research. Mann asserts that a targeted project involving respondent-directed sampling should enable reliable analysis of the stability of Littwin’s conclusions over a larger area.
Cathy Lesser Mansfield
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 26
In response to Professor Littwin’s Article, Cathy Mansfield praises the article’s proposed borrower-driven protections. But Mansfield argues that the article does not provide a solid basis for its conclusion that usury regulation would limit access to credit-card credit for low-income households and so is undesirable from both public-policy and low-income-household perspectives. Mansfield concludes that Littwin’s proposals are groundbreaking but can only be enhanced by reasonable government rate regulation.
Mark S. Stein
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 15
In his response to Professor Hill’s Article, Mark Stein argues for a somewhat different framing of the substantive due process right advocated by Professor Hill. Stein favors a right to receive necessary medical treatment free of government interference. However, he does not believe that the right should apply across the board. If, in a particular setting, allowing a claim of medical necessity would have negative consequences for social welfare, no right of medical necessity should be recognized.
J. Scott Ballenger
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 7
In his response to Professor Hill’s Article, Scott Ballenger discusses issues of medical autonomy in light of his experience as counsel for the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs. While he ultimately agrees with Professor Hill on the existence of a fundamental right to make medical treatment decisions free of unwarranted government interference, he highlights two potential disagreements with the article. First, he argues for a greater emphasis on the distinction between laws genuinely protecting the public health and those invading purely private medical decisions. Second, he questions the assumption that the crucial debate in this area involves whether to trust judges or legislatures on issues of medical or scientific fact.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 57
Professor Lininger offers a brief reply to the comments on his article.
Sarah M. Buel
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 19
In this response, Professor Buel expounds on some of the constitutional issues that Professor Lininger discussed in his piece. By extending Sixth Amendment protection to defendant conduct, Buel argues that the Court is going beyond its intended meaning of simply preventing the state from denying defendants an opportunity to confront their accusers. Furthermore, Buel notes that the Court’s new bright line test for testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay creates more confusion than clarity by imparting a difficult temporal element that is virtually impossible for courts to utilize in a meaningful and consistent manner.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 29
In responding to Professor Lininger’s article, Casey Gwinn offers his perspective as a prosecutor who has been involved with domestic violence issues for the last twenty years. Gwinn offers four points to supplement the understanding of Lininger’s article. First, he argues that domestic violence prosecutors need to once again focus on evidence-based prosecutions instead of relying on hearsay statements. Second, he notes that the evidence-based prosecution method is alive and well in spite of the recent judicial pendulum swing. Third, Gwinn explains how the increased cooperation of domestic violence victims in prosecutions due to the Family Justice Center model influences the difficulties faced by domestic violence prosecutors. Finally, Gwinn suggests that although the legislative action proposed by Lininger should be applauded, we must not forget what we have learned about prosecuting domestic violence offenses from the last twenty years.