Cathy Lesser Mansfield
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 26
In response to Professor Littwin’s Article, Cathy Mansfield praises the article’s proposed borrower-driven protections. But Mansfield argues that the article does not provide a solid basis for its conclusion that usury regulation would limit access to credit-card credit for low-income households and so is undesirable from both public-policy and low-income-household perspectives. Mansfield concludes that Littwin’s proposals are groundbreaking but can only be enhanced by reasonable government rate regulation.
Mark S. Stein
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 15
In his response to Professor Hill’s Article, Mark Stein argues for a somewhat different framing of the substantive due process right advocated by Professor Hill. Stein favors a right to receive necessary medical treatment free of government interference. However, he does not believe that the right should apply across the board. If, in a particular setting, allowing a claim of medical necessity would have negative consequences for social welfare, no right of medical necessity should be recognized.
J. Scott Ballenger
86 Texas L. Rev. See Also 7
In his response to Professor Hill’s Article, Scott Ballenger discusses issues of medical autonomy in light of his experience as counsel for the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs. While he ultimately agrees with Professor Hill on the existence of a fundamental right to make medical treatment decisions free of unwarranted government interference, he highlights two potential disagreements with the article. First, he argues for a greater emphasis on the distinction between laws genuinely protecting the public health and those invading purely private medical decisions. Second, he questions the assumption that the crucial debate in this area involves whether to trust judges or legislatures on issues of medical or scientific fact.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 57
Professor Lininger offers a brief reply to the comments on his article.
Sarah M. Buel
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 19
In this response, Professor Buel expounds on some of the constitutional issues that Professor Lininger discussed in his piece. By extending Sixth Amendment protection to defendant conduct, Buel argues that the Court is going beyond its intended meaning of simply preventing the state from denying defendants an opportunity to confront their accusers. Furthermore, Buel notes that the Court’s new bright line test for testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay creates more confusion than clarity by imparting a difficult temporal element that is virtually impossible for courts to utilize in a meaningful and consistent manner.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 29
In responding to Professor Lininger’s article, Casey Gwinn offers his perspective as a prosecutor who has been involved with domestic violence issues for the last twenty years. Gwinn offers four points to supplement the understanding of Lininger’s article. First, he argues that domestic violence prosecutors need to once again focus on evidence-based prosecutions instead of relying on hearsay statements. Second, he notes that the evidence-based prosecution method is alive and well in spite of the recent judicial pendulum swing. Third, Gwinn explains how the increased cooperation of domestic violence victims in prosecutions due to the Family Justice Center model influences the difficulties faced by domestic violence prosecutors. Finally, Gwinn suggests that although the legislative action proposed by Lininger should be applauded, we must not forget what we have learned about prosecuting domestic violence offenses from the last twenty years.
G. Kristian Miccio
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 39
In this response, Professor Miccio critiques Professor Lininger’s article for accepting the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions for witness unavailability and social accountability. More specifically, Professor Miccio suggests that we should question three aspects of the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence: first, she illustrates the problems with equating a trial with a search for truth; second, she argues that we should not view confrontation as synonymous with a battered woman’s resistance of her attacker; and finally, she questions the Court’s definition of an “emergency” with respect to testimonial and nontestimonial statements. Given the implications of accepting the Court at face value on these points, Professor Miccio then analyzes Professor Lininger’s proposals for legislative action, and suggests that effective legislative reform requires accountability.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 49
In her response to Professor Lininger’s piece, Professor Tuerkheimer explores utilizing the doctrine of forfeiture in the wake of the new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. While recognizing that state forfeiture statutes provide new tools for the prosecution of domestic violence, Tuerkheimer highlights the importance of recognizing that the crime of battering is unique and, thus, forfeiture can only be properly utilized in this paradigm of courts are sensitive to this reality.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 1
In his response to Professor Goodman, Professor Anderson explores several facets of Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity. One aspect of sponsorship disclosure laws that Anderson examines is the complementary need for greater and more vigorous enforcement. Anderson also questions the rationale behind applying sponsorship disclosure laws uniformly to all types of media, drawing distinctions between news media and entertainment media.
85 Texas L. Rev. See Also 11
In this Response piece, Prof. Goldman explores the potential adverse consequences of Prof. Goodman’s proposal for sponsorship disclosure laws. More specifically, Goldman argues that any deliberation on such disclosure laws must consider: (i) why consumers desire to know the source of content; (ii) whether consumer distrust of marketing wrongly affects consumers’ evaluation of content; and (iii) the adverse effects of “noisy” disclosures.