89 Texas L. Rev. 1403
Judicial biography, writes Dean Larry Kramer, is a difficult genre. The work of judges is not often exciting and cases that a judge decides tend to make up the substance of a judicial life. But, Kramer notes, reading about lawsuits can be less than stimulating.
In reviewing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion, Kramer finds the authors “were unable to surmount the inherent limitations of the genre.” Kramer notes that the authors faced some serious constraints: Justice Brennan’s life was not particularly interesting before he went on the bench, he was involved in almost nothing off the bench, and he was extremely reserved in and about his personal life. Although Brennan was a friendly, gregarious, and likeable person, Kramer thinks that these qualities themselves made up a form of reserve.
Another problem Kramer highlights is that the biography took twenty-five years to complete. 547 pages, the majority of which describe case decisions, is too much, no matter the quality of the writing. The authors do, however, include some interesting facts throughout. For example, Justice Brennan experienced discomfort with women clerks. Also, he was the Court’s only member with prior judicial experience when he was appointed.
The more important question, argues Kramer, is how did this ordinary man become such an extraordinary judge? Kramer spends some time discussing Brennan’s legacy and his accomplishments as a judge. Brennan was a coalition builder and a leader among his colleagues. Kramer thinks that part of his success in these roles is due to the fact that Brennan was someone who did not hate. That is, he was without anger, without malice, and without bitterness. Indeed, writes Kramer, he “had a genuine, almost automatic, empathy for everyone and everything.” It was Brennan’s ability to inspire people, both personally and through his opinions, to strive to do and be better for which Kramer will remember him.
Frank I. Michelman
89 Texas L. Rev. 1409
Stern and Wermiel, writes Professor Michelman, claim that Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion is a tale of surprise. Not only did Brennan’s service on the U.S. Supreme Court turn out liberal, but it also turned out to be historically momentous, as Brennan became arguably the most influential justice of the entire twentieth century, not to mention the most forceful and effective liberal ever to serve on the Court.
Michelman looks closely at these claims. He notes that Holmes and Brandeis may challene Brennan as the most influential justice of the twentieth century. Michelman also questions the second claim, wondering whether Brandeis, Frankfurter, Warren, Black, Douglas, or Marshall might have better claims to being the champion liberal justice in the Court’s history.
Michelman makes note of the celebratory tone of the book regarding Brennan’s liberalism, which never expresses doubt about Brennan’s liberal cause. But Michelman is unsure exactly how Brennan’s liberalism should be classified. While the book provides a profile of it in the form of data points, Michelman writes that it is left to the reader “to connect the dots as liberalism.” He argues that Brennan is not a classical or pragmatist liberal, as Brennan was “a stout defender of the uses of reverse race-based discrimination, of the state’s power to impair undoubtedly lawful property holdings for non-urgent reasons, of ‘welfare’ at taxpayer expense.” He also acknowledges that the authors are not writing as general historians but instead might be identifying Brennan as a liberal within the contemporary political polemical meaning of the word. But he does not think this is quite right either.
Instead, Michelman argues that the best fit is “‘liberal’ in a sense akin to what Rawlsian political philosophy has in mind.” He thinks this is what the Stern and Wermiel meant by the word, even if they didn’t intentionally say so. The egalitarian views of the Rawlsian group liberals with which Brennan should be identified, writes Michelman, come “from the political–philosophical ideas of Immanuel Kant.” He then details how Brennan’s judicial views align with this group of liberal thinkers. Michelman finds it somewhat surprising that the authors have such a historically recent philosophical turn on the term “liberal.”
Robert M O‘Neil
89 Texas L. Rev. 1417
In the opening of his review, Professor O’Neil states that “[a]ny lingering doubt [about the durability Justice Brennan’s legacy on the Supreme Court] has now been allayed by the publication of Stephen Wermiel’s and Seth Stern’s prodigious biography,” Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion.
O’Neil details how Brennan selected Wermiel to be his official biographer in the 1980s. Wermiel enjoyed great access to both the confidential papers and personal insights of Brennan. Wermiel also continued gathering material after Brennan’s retirement, joining the Justice and his former clerks for their annual dinner. In the 1990s, amid fear that the biography would not be published, Seth Stern joined Wermiel in the writing and researching to accelerate the process to its completion.
This extensive process helped correct some historical inaccuracies. For example, President Eisenhower was said to have expressed regret over his Supreme Court selections (Brennan and Warren), calling them his two mistakes, which he never actually did.
O’Neil also notes that “a striking value of the book is the authors’ capacity to distill areas of emphasis that transcend chronology.” One such area is Brennan’s role as a judicial colleague, which included his notable ability “to craft tenuous majorities for important civil rights and liberties.” Another important role for Brennan was that of mentor to his clerks.
O’Neil writes that the authors have been “realistic about the limitations of an ultimately imperfect ‘champion.’” They include coverage of a variety of challenges Brennan faces, such as his first wife’s illness as well as the family’s persistent penury. For details of family and collegial insights, the authors were forced to rely by necessity on “Nancy Brennan as the sole actively involved family survivor.” O’Neil adds a word of caution in this respect.
O’Neil lastly discusses the authors’ characterizations of the Justice, such as “liberal” and “First Amendment champion.” He notes that much has been written already about these issues, and concludes that “one should read Liberal Champion with full realization of the limitations and imperfections of its subject, but with no lesser measure of admiration both for the Justice and for the long-sought but most welcome biography.”
Geoffrey R. Stone
89 Texas L. Rev. 1423
In this review of Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion, Professor Stone examines Brennan’s jurisprudence and asks whether “the pejorative ‘judicial activist” [is] warranted.” Stone first looks at the Court’s economic substantive due process decisions before Brennan joined the Court. These decisions, writes Stone, “represented a highly controversial form of conservative judicial activism.” Critics of this type of jurisprudence learned different lessons. On the one hand, some, like Justice Frankfurter, decided that judicial activism was illegitimate and unwarranted. Others, like Brennan, thought that judicial activism was not necessarily wrong. But Lochner v. New York was not an appropriate case for judicial activism.
So, it was this concept of selective judicial activism that shaped Brennan’s jurisprudence. This view, argues Stone, “is deeply rooted in the original understanding of the purpose of judicial review in our system of constitutional governance.” In light of this, Stone discusses the Framers and the contested inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. And it was an “originalist” conception of judicial review, Stone writes, that informed Brennan’s selective judicial activism. Given that anti-majoritarian decisions of the kind Brennan famously wrote tend to not sit well with the majority, it is unsurprising that his jurisprudence thus received harsh criticism, especially from the political arena.
Stone next examines the shift in the judicial makeup of the Court. The Court had become just as conservative by 1993 as it was liberal in 1968. But the meaning of “conservative” had also shifted in the modern era. Previously, it meant a justice committed to judicial restraint. In the modern era, it came to mean a form of selective judicial activism. Stone writes that the jurisprudence behind modern conservative decisions to, for example, hold unconstitutional affirmative action programs and gun control regulations “has about it the distinctive air of Platonic guardianship,” exhibiting no judicial restraint. Stone argues that while there is a discernable conception of judicial review beneath Brennan’s use of judicial activism, there is no similar explanation for the jurisprudence of contemporary conservative judicial activists.
What would constitutional law look like today had justices with the same vision as Brennan remained a majority on the Supreme Court? According to Stone, such a counterfactual Court might have held, for example, “not that corporations have a constitutional right to spend millions to buy the elected representatives of their choice, but that public officials cannot constitutionally use partisan gerrymandering to ensure their perpetuation in power.” Stone concludes that interpreting the Constitution is not a mechanical, value-free enterprise. Instead, as Brennan insisted, the Court’s responsibility in this regard is to “keep the community true to its own fundamental principles.”
Anthony F. Arguijo
89 Texas L. Rev. 1433
A defendant’s net worth is discoverable under Texas law for purposes of exemplary damages. However, as to what constitutes net worth, the law provides little additional guidance. In this Note, Arguijo addresses the net-worth debate and proposes a solution to some of the problems.
The author first presents the evolution of Texas law in this area, looking at cases such as Lunsford v. Morrisand Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez. Initially, courts allowed broad discovery, but they have begun to limit the amount of discoverable information. Indeed, many courts have formulated their own tests regarding net worth. The most common of these relies upon Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Arguijo next analyzes the GAAP approach to net-worth discovery. GAAP has a number of advantages, including the clarity and consistency of its rules. While at first glance the GAAP approach appears to offer the best solution to the inconsistency in this area of the law, Arguijo finds this approach has shortcomings in light of the policy justifications for net-worth discovery in exemplary-damage cases.
Arguijo then examines the policy justifications and concerns regarding net-worth discovery. It is intrusive, he writes, but concerns about privacy cannot end the discussion. These privacy concerns must instead be balanced against the policy justification for such damages, which is punishment.
Thus, Arguijo offers a solution for the proper standard for net-worth discovery. He argues that in exemplary-damages cases, courts should allow the discovery necessary to give an accurate representation of the defendant’s current net worth. This standard addresses concerns over both timing and materials. Arguijo notes that this is not the only solution to the problem, and the Texas Supreme Court has a number of options to choose from. The important thing, writes Arguijo, is that clarity exists.
Jonah D. Jackson
89 Texas L. Rev. 1453
In this Note, Mr. Jackson argues that the “product of nature” and “isolation and purification” doctrines of patent law require the exclusion of gene patents encompassing functional genetic information. Under the product of nature doctrine, there can be no patents for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. But under the isolation and purification doctrine, genetic material, despite being a naturally occurring substance, is patentable when separate from its naturally occurring environment. According to a 2005 estimate, 20% of the human genome was already subject to issued patents.
Jackson first introduces the basic science of genes and argues that they are best conceived of as carriers of information with unique properties significant to the question of patentability. He then explains both the product of nature and isolation and purification doctrines and identifies the rationales behind them. These doctrines currently permit the patenting of genes. Jackson argues that gene patents encompassing functional genetic information should be excluded from patentability under the product of nature doctrine. This doctrine is concerned with excluding subject matter with a broad scope and of a fundamentally essential nature both because of economic consequences of patenting such subject matter and the broader implications to a democratic society.
Next, Jackson breaks down the economic and moral arguments against gene patents before tying them to both the characteristics of genetic information and the doctrines previously described. Lastly, he discusses the prospects for exclusion of genetic information from patentable subject matter and takes up some objections. For example, some defenders of gene patents argue that thirty years of jurisprudence should not be overturned when the research on the negative consequences of gene patents is still equivocal. Jackson writes that this assumes gene patents were justified in the first place, but he thinks the evidence demonstrates this protection was never truly necessary.
Jackson concludes that opponents of gene patents face an uphill battle. He hopes that this Note can help combat the inertia of current law and lead to an understanding that, like the heat of the sun, genes are unpatentable products of nature.
John M. Golden
89 Texas L. Rev. 1041
In this Article, Professor Golden argues that Congress should expand the USPTO’s rulemaking authority so that it encompasses substantive questions of subject-matter eligibility. This proposal would explicitly split “interpretive authority over substantive patent law between the USPTO and the federal judiciary,” which would “further hybridize patent law’s legal regime and break from a common paradigm under which primary interpretive authority of the substance of a statutory regime lies either wholly with the courts or wholly with an administrative agency.”
Golden first describes the already hybrid nature of U.S. patent law’s legal regime. Next, he presents the case for giving the USPTO binding interpretive authority over subject-matter eligibility as a means toward patent law’s commonly accepted utilitarian ends. He does this by describing the nature of subject-matter inquiries and developing mathematical models that help justify their continued use as patentability filters.
Golden then argues that the generally categorical nature of questions of subject-matter eligibility suggests that they are especially appropriate for agency rulemaking, an argument which is bolstered by an analysis of comparative institutional competence. Golden finds a lack of judicial facility for resolving such problems. Moreover, Congress lacks the sustained interest, time, and knowledge to resolve subject-matter eligibility’s bounds. The USPTO thus appears to be the best potential institutional candidate, having both the expertise and the incentive to deal with the issue.
However, as an administrative agency the USPTO is also vulnerable to concerns of capture and bias. But Golden argues that such concerns are not as great as is often contended and they can be further diluted through additional institutional reforms. Indeed, Golden points out that the USPTO already has an established record of developing nonbinding but influential interpretive rules on matters of substance. Granting the USPTO primary interpretive authority over subject-matter eligibility issues might allow it to clear doctrinal tangles generated by the courts. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos, writes Golden,does not indicate otherwise.
Jesse M. Fried
89 Texas L. Rev. 1113
Executives of public companies receive most of their pay in equity compensation, which is intended to better align their interests with those of the firm’s shareholders. However, most equity compensation is tied to the short-term stock price, which may shift the executives’ focus from long-term value. Professor Fried identifies a different problem, which arises when the executive is free to sell stock in the short-term or must hold it for the long-term. Tying payoffs to the stock price, argues Fried, fails to align executives’ interests with the maximization of aggregate shareholder value, which is the amount of value flowing to all the firm’s shareholders over time. Fried shows that tying payoffs to the future stock price can even encourage executives to take steps to destroy aggregate shareholder value.
Two distortions result from tying executives’ payoffs to the future stock price. When the current price is below its actual value, executives whose pay is tied to the future stock price are rewarded for funding bargain-price share repurchases rather than making productive investments in the firm. When the stock price is higher than its actual value, these executives are rewarded for issuing new shares even if the firm cannot productively use the consideration received in exchange. Fried calls these “costly contractions” and “costly expansions.”
These distortions arise because the executives’ interests are aligned only with investors who do not buy or sell shares until the executive cashes out her equity. Executive interests are not aligned with those shareholders that either sell or purchase shares before the executive cashes out.
Fried proposes a mechanism that would perfectly tie executive pay to aggregate shareholder value, which he calls the “constant-share” approach. Accordingly, executives must adjust their equity holdings in the firm whenever it purchases or sells its own shares to keep them constant through the transaction, selling shares whenever the firms repurchases its own stock and buying whenever it issues new equity.
Fried acknowledges that problems with this approach exist. It will make it more difficult for executives to personally benefit, so they can be expected to resist its adoption. Also, it may lead to a lower stock price, which could in turn increase the likelihood of a takeover attempt or proxy fight. So, directors may also be against adopting it.
Mark L. Ascher
89 Texas L. Rev. 1149
As a result of intense lobbying, problematic legislative trends have developed over the last several decades in the law of the dead (as Professor Ascher refers to the law of wills and trusts). Here Professor Ascher reviews Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts, and Inheritance Law by Lawrence M. Friedman, which explores the reach and longevity of the Dead Hand.
Ascher outlines and discusses four important changes in the law of the dead included in Friedman’s book. These involve changes in family structure, record keeping, demographics and culture, and societal attitudes toward wealth and the wealthy. One important change in family structure, for example, is a shift from focusing on the bloodline family to the family of affection and dependence. Another example is that the surviving spouse once only received limited inheritance, while today the surviving spouse is usually the primary if not exclusive taker. Although Friedman thinks this reflects a change in the family structure, Ascher argues that it is “attributable to and emblematic of the ever-increasing stature of women in American society.”
Ascher also examines the development of dynastic trusts and how such trusts concern societal attitudes toward wealth, in particular of the dynastic kind. Friedman thinks that in the beginning, Americans were initially skeptical of such wealth, but the end of the nineteenth century saw much more acceptance for it. Ascher, however, argues that the Progressive Movement was yet to come, which embodied a continued skepticism of dynastic wealth. Ascher then discusses other aspects of trusts and the changes thereto, some of which are troubling. But Friedman’s book, according to Ascher, lacks a sense of outrage over these developments, even though Friedman is critical of other issues, which is Ascher’s biggest criticism.
Ascher then looks at Friedman’s treatment of charitable gifts and foundations, and later, “death” taxes. He also returns to Friedman’s argument that our collective attitude toward wealth has changed, which Ascher does not believe to be the case. Ascher notes that we have strayed far from Thomas Jefferson’s warnings against establishing an aristocracy. Both the estate tax and the rule against perpetuities have been the primary means of preventing the accumulation and propagation of dynastic wealth. It is troubling then that both have recently been curtailed. Yet, Ascher concludes, it would not be difficult to get back on the right path, with a few sensible changes to the rules.
F. Gibbons Addison
89 Texas L. Rev. 1179
In this Note, the author addresses the U.S. system of wealth redistribution. According to Addison, the present wealth inequality between the rich and the poor is due to unequal opportunity, meaning an individual’s ability to pursue her objectives without interference from arbitrary obstacles.
Addison finds a solution to this problem in the revenue sharing system of professional sports leagues. Sports leagues employ such a system to increase the competitive balance of the league, which increases profits in the long run, even for high-revenue teams that contribute a portion of their revenues for distribution to low-revenue teams. Similarly, Addison argues that the U.S. should address wealth inequality by substituting the goals of equality and fairness for competition.
Addison begins with an overview of wealth redistribution in the U.S., starting in the colonial period with the influence of Adam Smith and continuing through the New Deal and the civil rights movement until arriving at the present system. Addison turns to an overview of revenue sharing in American professional sports, discussing the importance of cooperation in order to increase competition, ticket-sale sharing, and the potential problem of teams’ ability to exploit sources of local revenue.
Next, the author analyzes wealth redistribution in sports leagues. Addison notes some possible imperfections to the systems but argues that the leagues need low-revenue teams to be successful. The goal of revenue sharing, writes Addison, is not perfect competition but competitive balance.