Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity


Prof. Ellen P. Goodman
Article appears in Issue 1
Citation: 85 Texas L. Rev. 83 (2006)

Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity is the first article in the legal literature to address the normative implications of covert marketing in mass media.  For business, technological, and cultural reasons, advertisers and propagandists are increasingly using editors to pass off promotional messages as editorial content.  This integration of sponsorship allows marketers to cut through communications clutter and audience resistance to marketing.

In this way, the practices of payola, product placement, and sponsored journalism are proliferating and spreading into newer media forms like blogs and video games.  A federal sponsorship disclosure law has proscribed these practices in broadcasting for nearly a century.  Despite high-profile recent controversies about the practices, the legal literature is devoid of any systematic analysis of the problem that stealth marketing presents or the values that sponsorship disclosure might serve, whether in broadcasting or other media.  This Article fills that void by providing a normative theory of sponsorship disclosure law informed by the First Amendment, bribery law, and information theory more generally.

Responses in See Also:

Hidden Agendas - A Response

Prof. David Anderson

In his response to Professor Goodman, Professor Anderson explores several facets of Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity.  One aspect of sponsorship disclosure laws that Anderson examines is the complementary need for greater and more vigorous enforcement.  Anderson also questions the rationale behind applying sponsorship disclosure laws uniformly to all types of media, drawing distinctions between news media and entertainment media.

Stealth Risks of Stealth Marketing

Prof. Eric Goldman

In this response piece, Professor Goldman explores the potential adverse consequences of Professor Goodman’s proposal for sponsorship disclosure laws.  More specifically, Goldman argues that any deliberation on such disclosure laws must consider: (i) why consumers desire to know the source of content; (ii) whether consumer distrust of marketing wrongly affects consumers’ evaluation of content; and (iii) the adverse effects of “noisy” disclosures.

Comments on Stealth Marketing

Prof. R. Polk Wagner

 Given the rapid and recent changes in the character and nature of media markets, Professor Wagner questions the necessity of an effort to enact sponsorship disclosure laws.  Concentrating on the lack of assurance that such disclosure will enhance editorial integrity and on the effects of the “long tail” of available media outlets, Wagner suggests why we should be skeptical of Professor Goodman’s proposed disclosure regime.