A Theory of Justiciability


Prof. Jonathan R. Siegel
Article appears in Issue 1
Citation: 86 Texas L. Rev. 73 (2007)

Article III justiciability doctrines are often viewed as important checks on judicial overreaching, deriving their ultimate authority from the Constitution and its conception of the proper role of the Judicial Branch.  This Article takes on the question of whether such doctrines are really so central or important to prevent unwanted judicial expansion.  It concludes that such doctrines are in fact minor determinants of judicial behavior.

This Article finds that in contrast to other constitutional checks on the power of government, it is difficult to discern what intelligible purpose Article III justiciability doctrines actually serve.  After undertaking an investigation into this question, Siegel argues that proposals by courts and scholars as to the purposes of justiciability doctrines are by and large implausible.  Out of this thicket of confusion, Seigel proposes a new way to intelligently apply justiciability doctrines—to “reconstitute” justiciability into a purposeful restriction.  This reconstitution would focus on whether justiciability doctrines actually enhance judicial function.  Such a purpose-based view of justiciability would seek to limit the substance but not the form of judicial action.  The Article argues that this approach would allow a relaxation of justiciability doctrines that would nonetheless prevent the Judiciary from exceeding its proper role in a democratic society.

Responses in See Also:

Form, Function, and Justiciability

Prof. Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

In his response to Professor Siegel’s Article, Professor Bellia takes a closer look at some of the Article’s conclusions.  In particular, Professor Bellia responds to the assertion that congressional power to generate justiciability demonstrates the purposelessness of justiciability doctrines.  Are justiciability doctrines an effective limit on federal power?  If constraining the power of a federal institution can be a legitimate constitutional purpose in itself, does congressional control over justiciability act as a real, and not merely illusory, limit on judicial power?