This Article challenges the conventional view of the effects of academic standards under the No Child Left Behind Act on school finance litigation.  Suits litigated over the last fifteen years against states challenging the way that they fund their schools under state constitutions reflect the adoption of a new litigation strategy.  Rather than focusing on “equity” of funding, lawyers have been focusing on the “adequacy” of such funding by asking whether the funding is enough to provide an adequate education to students.

In the absence of the standards and testing procedures mandated by No Child Left Behind, such suits could founder at the definitional stage—specifically in trying to define what “adequate” means in terms of funding.  Courts not trained to make such determinations might be less reluctant to enter into and less likely to remain in school funding disputes when faced with this “knotty” definitional problem.  In this vein, the “emerging consensus among commentators, which is hardening into conventional wisdom” states that the standards and testing requirements of No Child Left Behind are a boon for school finance plaintiffs because they provide courts with a legislative benchmark for adequate performance.

This Article criticizes that emerging consensus and attempts to point out the many flaws in its reasoning.   First, the Article argues that the claim that standards and testing have already helped school finance plaintiffs is wrong as an empirical matter.  Second, Professor Ryan argues that the belief that standards and testing will help school finance plaintiffs is also misguided.  By looking at actual school finance cases, this Article shows that courts have almost never utilized legislative standards to define adequacy.  Professor Ryan also argues that the utilization of standards in school finance litigation may (1) narrow the focus on what constitutes “education” (and thereby reduce the ambitiousness of reform); (2) actually encourage courts to preserve the funding status quo; and (3) create “perverse” incentives for state legislatures to lower standards in order to make education cheaper.  Assuming, as Professor Ryan does, that failing schools require more funding, the standards approach could actually harm, rather than benefit, school finance plaintiffs.

Finally, this Article argues that “[c]ourts, litigants, and commentators should focus their attention on fleshing out the idea of comparability” of resources between schools.  Professor Ryan emphasizes and strongly advocates “tying” strategies in education reform.  Application of a comparability standard is also better suited to courts’ institutional capabilities because “courts are in a better position to compare resources than they are to determine the link between particular inputs and certain outcomes.”  Accepting the premise that more funding will improve failing schools, Professor Ryan concludes that comparability of resources offers a better framework for school finance plaintiffs trying to bring more state funding into underfunded school districts.