Restrictions on anticompetitive behavior are enforced in one of two ways: either through direct government regulation, or through the administration of antitrust law.  In their Article, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gamin, Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley note that Supreme Court decisions of the past decade have subordinated antitrust law to direct government regulation.  They argue that this is problematic because whereas antitrust law may be interpreted by courts to prevent businesses from achieving anticompetitive ends, regulation consists of inflexible rules which may be exploited. 

In support of this distinction, they cite the phenomenon of "regulatory gaming," which they define as "private behavior that harnesses pro-competitive or neutral regulations and uses them for exclusionary purposes"—for example, cases where drug companies have repeatedly made changes to drug formulations in order to prevent generic substitution rather than increase efficacy.  To address these sorts of problems, Dogan and Lemley assert that regulatory gaming should be properly addressed by antitrust law, rather than regulation.