In this note, Russell Falconer surveys the evolving, contemporary view of the First Amendment's Press Clause as a constitutional provision designed to bestow the American press with institutional protections. First Amendment rights commonly associated with judicial efforts to assure freedom of the press, such as freedom from prior restraint, right to judicial safeguards, and raised thresholds for libel when publications pertain to matters of public concern, have all been held to emanate from the Speech Clause. 

Because the judiciary has traditionally protected the free speech rights of individual members of the press under the rubric of the Speech Clause, some academics have argued that the Press Clause carries meaning only if it is interpreted to establish a collective right, recognizing the press's institutional value as an important check on government power. Falconer, however, observes that this novel view, which posits a constitutional right not vesting in individuals, challenges traditional notions of standing. Nonetheless, he argues that the resulting difficulties need not be fatal to an institutional interpretation of the Press Clause.